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In its  standard  format,  the concept  of homeostasis  refers  to  the  ability,  present  in  all  living
organisms,  of  continuously  maintaining  certain  functional  variables  within  a range  of  val-
ues compatible  with  survival.  The  mechanisms  of  homeostasis  were  originally  conceived  as
strictly  automatic  and  as pertaining  only  to  the  state  of an organism’s  internal  environment.
In  keeping  with  this  concept,  homeostasis  was,  and  still  is,  often  explained  by analogy  to
a thermostat:  upon  reaching  a previously  set temperature,  the  device  commands  itself  to
either suspend  the  ongoing  operation  (cooling  or heating),  or to initiate  it, as appropriate.
This  traditional  explanation  fails to  capture  the  richness  of  the  concept  and  the  range  of
circumstances  in  which  it can  be applied  to living  systems.  Our goal  here  is to  consider  a
more comprehensive  view  of homeostasis.  This  includes  its  application  to systems  in which
the presence  of  conscious  and  deliberative  minds,  individually  and  in social  groups,  per-
mits the  creation  of supplementary  regulatory  mechanisms  aimed  at achieving  balanced
and  thus  survivable  life  states  but  more  prone  to failure  than  the  fully  automated  mecha-
nisms.  We  suggest  that an economy  is an example  of one  such  regulatory  mechanism,  and
that  facts  regarding  human  homeostasis  may  be of  value  in the  study  of  economic  prob-
lems. Importantly,  the  reality  of  human  homeostasis  expands  the  views  on  preferences  and
rational choice  that are  part  of traditionally  conceived  Homo  economicus  and  casts  doubts
on economic  models  that  depend  only  on an “invisible  hand”  mechanism.
©  2015  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
. What is homeostasis?
The idea behind homeostasis originated with the French physiologist Claude Bernard, in the late nineteenth century.
ernard noted that living systems needed to maintain numerous variables of their internal milieu within fairly narrow
anges so that life would continue and did so quite naturally (Bernard, 1878). The essence of the internal milieu (milieu
ntérieur in the original) is a large number of coordinated chemistries. The standard bearers of such chemistries can be found
n the blood stream, where they help accomplish metabolism, and in certain circuits of the nervous system where parts of
ife regulation are coordinated. The chemical messaging makes the processing of energy sources possible by ensuring that
ater, nutrients and oxygen are present in living tissues in appropriate quantities. This is necessary so that the respective
ells maintain their individual lives, and that the organism can survive as an integrated whole. Deviations from the requisite
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level of certain variables above or below speciﬁc critical values, result in disease, and, if not corrected, death. The genomes
of all living organisms ensure the machinery of homeostasis.
The term homeostasis, in turn, was coined by Walter Cannon, an American physiologist (Cannon, 1929) half a century
later and he too was referring to living systems. To name the process he chose the Greek root homeo- [for similar] and not
homo- [for same], because, rather than thinking about ﬁxed set points, which are often present in systems engineered by
humans, such as thermostats, he was thinking of systems engineered by nature, whose variables often exhibit workable
ranges—hydration, blood glucose, blood sodium, temperature, and so forth. The synonymous terms “allostasis” and “het-
erostasis” were introduced later with a good purpose: calling attention to the fact that life regulation operates relative to
ranges of values rather than set points (Richter, 1943; McEwen, 1998). But the idea behind those more recent terms is not
essentially different from the one conveyed by the original term and the terms have not entered common use (Day, 2005).
The main problem with the classical concept of homeostasis, however, has little to do with terminology. The problem is
that the traditional concept of homeostasis does not usually conjure up the fact that there are two distinct kinds of control
of internal milieu parameters, and the extraordinary signiﬁcance of that duality is thus ignored. Speciﬁcally, the traditional
concept of homeostasis calls attention to a non-conscious form of physiological control which operates automatically without
awareness or deliberation on the part of the organism. Indeed seeking food or drink when energy sources are depleted can
be achieved by most organisms without any willful intervention on their part. Should food or drink not be available in the
environment, hormones automatically break down sugars stored in certain cells and deliver them to the blood as needed
to offset the deﬁcit. Likewise, when water balance is low, the kidneys automatically slow down their operation in order to
reduce diuresis and restore the level of hydration (Kotas and Medzhitov, 2015).
In numerous living creatures, however, and in humans for certain, the traditional concept of homeostasis provides an
incomplete version of reality. Humans also beneﬁt from automatic controls, of course. But in human beings and in good
probability in most vertebrates, there is a supplementary mechanism of control that involves feelings of the simplest variety,
also known as homeostatic feelings. We  need to know what homeostatic feelings are and how they operate (Berridge and
Kringelbach, 2015; Damasio, 2000, 2010; Damasio and Carvalho, 2013).
2. Augmenting the range of basic homeostasis by means of feeling and consciousness
Homeostatic feelings operate within the compass of basic homeostasis. They intervene in the solution of essential
problems of life regulation. Examples of homeostatic feelings include thirst, hunger, desire, pleasure, well-being, malaise,
and certain kinds of pain. Feelings are regulatory interfaces and curiously they are double-sided, a trait that tends to be
unacknowledged. One side of the feeling phenomenon corresponds to standard physiological operations and includes the
chemical and cellular mechanisms that typically allow for the automatic regulation of internal body variables, for example,
the uptake of excessive circulatory glucose by fat cells under the inﬂuence of insulin, and the simultaneous suppression of
release of glucose from cells in which sugars are stored. The other side of the feeling phenomenon is mental, and it provides
organisms with something evolutionarily new: a direct and explicit experience.  It allows the owner of that experience to
sense the state that its organism is in. Consider for example a restriction of the airway into the lungs, in an enclosed space
or under water. The situation generates a forceful, rapid and automatic motor reaction aimed at gaining access to air. This is
observable in any living creature, non-human and human alike, that depends on respiration to deliver oxygen to its internal
milieu. This is entirely automatic. The fact that in humans this reaction is also felt as air hunger and experienced as fear is a
bonus that guarantees our attention to the danger the organism faces but is not essential for the basic, automated, motor
reaction to kick in.
What does mental experience bring to the table then? Each feeling experience has a certain content, a certain intensity,
and a certain valence. The content refers to what the feeling describes (for example, the acceleration of the heart and the
difﬁculty breathing that often appears in anxiety states). The parameter of intensity is self explanatory: feelings can be weak
or strong. The critical parameter, however, is valence, positive or negative. It gives feelings their pleasant aspect (joyful,
energetic, enthusiastic, relaxed) or unpleasant aspect (disagreeable, painful, sick). The ensemble of these parameters of
feeling is informative. It indicates to the mind of the organism’s owner, in rapid, global, summary style, whether the current
state of the organism is generally conducive to continued health or even ﬂourishing (well-being is an example), or if that
state requires a correction (hunger or thirst, certain kinds of pain or malaise are examples of the latter). In other words,
feelings are informative regulatory interfaces.  Their mental aspect, emerging as it does in consciousness, turns the owner of
the respective organism into a potential agent of its own  regulation.
We need to make clear that the potential for individual, conscious, intervention in its life regulation, depends on two
elements. First, the evolutionarily novel presence of a mental aspect,  which opens a channel of information into the mind
processes of the organism’s owner. Second, the fact that the mental aspect of feelings is valenced and is either affectively
positive or negative. This valence commands the attention of the organism’s owner. It literally compels that owner to act on
the information provided by feeling. Valence dictates action, namely, “correct as needed”, “correct urgently”, or “do little
or nothing”, or “do more of what you have been doing”. Feelings are by deﬁnition affect-full mental representations and do
not permit indifferent experiences. They seize the owner and experiencer. References to feeling that omit the full range of
components described above, do not capture the reality and signiﬁcance of the phenomenon.
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. Comparing the two varieties of homeostatic control
The simple automated kind of homeostatic control is generally reliable and efﬁcacious. It is optimal for relatively simple
rganisms and it requires an appropriate niche. The conscious, feeling variety of regulation adds a number of advantages.
he organism becomes far more adaptable to a larger range of circumstances. The fact that feelings are experienced in
ind compels the organism’s owner to action and promotes learning. The efﬁciency of memory increases when the facts
f a situation are present via mental states imbued with positive or negative valences, i.e. present with the incentives or
isincentives, which correspond, in classical learning and memory studies, to appetitive or aversive conditions. On the other
and, the conscious/feeling variety of homeostatic regulation is far more prone to malfunction than the plain, automatic
ersion. This is because it offers too much freedom of operation. It allows the organism’s owner to make non-preprogrammed
hoices and those choices may, immediately or over time, be in conﬂict with or even counter the main homeostatic goals.
How can we account of this greater vulnerability? One answer is that homeostatic feelings, as is the case with all feelings,
ngage components of the complex machinery of affect, namely, drives,  motivations, and emotions. That machinery has been
uilt for each species, over evolutionary time, by a slow process of variation, selection, and genomic ﬁtness tuning. Just as
mportantly, that machinery has been adjusted in every individual by experiences related to sociocultural circumstances. In
ther words, responses to homeostatic feeling states are not inﬂuenced only by the basic homeostatic variable that prompted
he feeling in the ﬁrst place; the responses are also affected by a host of phenomena associated with the processes of affect and
heir individual or cultural group tuning (Bisin and Verdier, 2001). These phenomena play a major role in the construction
f the possible menu of more or less deliberated responses to feelings. This is especially the case in humans, as should be
xpected and the result is the shaping of such affect-related phenomena as: a. social cooperation; b. behaviors related to
he in-group versus out-group status of each organism; c. the cultural identity built for each individual and for groups as a
esult of factors such as past social experiences and related historical and geographic factors; and d. the deployment of a host
f social emotions, such as compassion, altruism, gratitude, and indignation which are often engaged in a variety of social
ontexts (Damasio et al., 2000; Immordino-Yang et al., 2009; Singer, 2015; Fox et al., 2015). In turn, overtime, the repeated
ngagement of such responses contributes to the construction of human preferences, and ultimately, to the construction of
hat is known as rationality, in individual and in cultural groups.
. The downside of conscious, feeling driven regulation: the introduction of reﬂexivity and the increase in
allibility
The consequence of the role played by this complex set of affect-related factors is that some of the advantages that come
y way of conscious/feeling responses are easily reduced or lost. A system that regulates homeostasis by automated non-
onscious means has too narrow a control and is not sufﬁciently ﬂexible to take advantage of new opportunities or avoid
he misapplication of an automated response. But when homeostatic regulation is enriched by feeling/conscious interfaces,
daptability increases at the risk of basic efﬁciency. The system becomes too open to new possibilities. When organisms
nclude a conscious/feeling regulatory interface, they introduce a higher degree of uncertainty in the regulation which results
n less predictable and potentially less advantageous responses. The fallibility of the decision-making apparatus increases.
he novelty of some responses deviates from the standard path; in turn, the unexpected response generates yet another
on-standard response because the system is still searching for stability and oscillates. (Later in the text we  connect this
nstability to the notion of reﬂexivity as introduced by Popper (1959), and applied to the domain of economics by Soros
2013).)
We can illustrate the disregulation that results from feeling interfaces with examples from health, a critical human
roblem. The feeling of hunger, as opposed to a mere unfelt drop in the level of circulating glucose, enhances and guides one’s
earch for food, and thus secures energy sources. But food ingredients produce different degrees of pleasure and satiation.
hey taste differently; once they are consumed they have different effects in the gastro-intestinal tract; they are craved
ifferently; they can be greatly anticipated or merely tolerated; they can cause immediate pleasure but late discomfort. As a
onsequence, it is not that difﬁcult to eat in excess, especially ingredients whose effects are immediately positive, in terms
f feeling and energy production. Most fats and sugars are desirable prior to their consumption and pleasurable as they are
onsumed. To add insult to injury, they are comforting as they are digested. There is now ample evidence that the brain is
rofoundly inﬂuenced by the operations of the gastrointestinal tract. There is massive signaling from the gut to the brain
ia the enteric nervous system, one of the largest sectors of our entire nervous system, and the result of this inﬂuence does
anifest itself in the form of feelings (Mayer, 2011). Unfortunately, the ultimate effects of excessive consumption over time
re negative. They result, for example, in obesity and insulin resistance. Likewise, craving and over consuming salt in food is
leasurable but can contribute to unhealthy increases in blood pressure. In brief, the advantages of using feeling to mediate
ur choices, if not properly controlled by yet another layer of willful regulation, can become the primary cause of diseases
uch as diabetes, obesity, and hypertension (Morton et al., 2014; Wu  et al., 2012).
But the saga of homeostasis and its adjustments does not end here. Because nature is immensely resourceful such disease
rocesses tend to be countered by novel layers of automatic regulation. In other words, nature will attempt to control damage
aused by poor conscious choice, without any deliberate control.  This will happen at the same time that we, as conscious beings,
ay be trying to develop willful control of one’s excesses, individually or even socioculturally—an example of the former is
he personal attempt to curb excessive consumption; an example of the latter is the sort of health directives now frequently
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proposed by think-tanks and implemented by government agencies. The outcome of this mixed approach to a life-regulation
problem is mixed as well. For example, inﬂammatory processes are automatically aimed at correcting potentially threatening
deviations from homeostasis. Obesity can engage inﬂammation. Here is how: accumulation of toxic molecules in fat cells
as well as in cells of the liver and muscles renders these tissues dysfunctional. The dysfunction triggers an inﬂammatory
response whose natural, mindless intent is alleviating the problem. Ultimately, however, inﬂammation will aggravate the
situation because in order to do its job inﬂammation temporarily overrides homeostatic controls (DeFronzo, 2010; Oh et al.,
2012). As a result, the new layer of automatic regulation, which amounts to a rescue-mission, can end up perpetuating the
problem rather than ameliorating it. This is another example of the perils of reﬂexivity.
The corrections result in oscillatory behavior and increase fallibility. Intriguingly, the weak link in this chain of dis-
regulation comes from an evolutionary advance: the novel element introduced by feeling, consciousness and the possibility
of deliberate choices.
5. Homeostasis, cultural invention, and economics
Feelings have been a welcome and beneﬁcial evolutionary advance. We have good reasons to believe that feelings served
as an impetus for inventing responses to problems of life regulation that could not have been solved automatically by
the basic homeostatic devices that evolution had developed to maintain life. The compass of problems tackled by human
invention is very wide and the resulting solutions are numerous. They include the extremely practical—the fashioning of
tools, the harnessing of ﬁre, the development of agriculture, the invention of the wheel and of writing. These technological
advances have made life better in the sense that they boosted survival and led to greater well-being for many individuals.
The list of advances also includes somewhat less immediately practical inventions: arts such as music, a notable provider
of social cohesion, poetry and theater; moral and belief systems; justice and governance systems; and, obviously, economics.
In both sets of advances, the technical and the humanistic, the mechanism responsible for the new invention required the
identiﬁcation of a need, which was primarily accomplished on the basis of feelings, and the intellectual capacity to invent a new
solution. We  note that while the origin of these cultural instruments may  be traced to life regulation needs, the subsequent
development of these advances has given them considerable autonomy relative to the original needs and allowed them to
reach sublime levels of intellectual complexity. We  wish to make clear that we  are not trying to reduce the arts or systems
of belief and morality to mere responses to basic homeostatic needs. We  are simply attempting to point out likely motives
behind their origins, so that the operation of the system can be better understood.
We believe it is reasonable to list all these cultural advances under the general designation of sociocultural homeostasis, or
better still, “attempted” sociocultural homeostasis. We  say attempted because these sociocultural instruments may  appear
to be quite ancient but are, in point of fact, relatively recent in the overall history of evolution. Most human sociocultural
artifacts appeared in the late Pleistocene and have existed for a mere instant, in good likelihood a mere hundreds of thousands
of years. Living species, on the other hand, have been evolving and perfecting basic homeostasis for at least 700 million years.
Basic homeostasis has stabilized, to some extent; sociocultural homeostasis, on the other hand, is a work in progress, still
in “attempt” stage.
From the perspective of life regulation all the devices of sociocultural homeostasis appear to have their origin in an
identiﬁed need. They all aim at a goal compatible with both survival and a state of well-being. In other words, states of
physical equilibrium or of neutral balance do not appear sufﬁcient. An up-regulation toward well-being is easily identiﬁable
as a general human goal.
Economic systems have been created by humans to manage the production, allocation, and distribution of resources
necessary for the maintenance of life. They seem to have emerged naturally as sociocultural extensions of basic life man-
agement. They clearly contribute to making life possible in a complex environment and open paths to achieving well-being.
And, in keeping with the position we assign them as components of less than perfect sociocultural homeostatic devices, they
are quite open to malfunction.
We  believe it is worth exploring the implications of this biologic perspective in a systematic fashion using homeostasis as
a model. This would go beyond a general application of biology to decision-making as exempliﬁed, for example, in our own
somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994, 1996; Bechara et al., 1994) and in the work of other colleagues (Kahneman et al.,
1997; Robson, 2001). It is beyond the scope of this brief essay to discuss the application in detail but we  can point to issues
whose study in the homeostatic perspective would appear promising. For example, the notion of humans as exclusively
self-interested in terms of means and goals, is closer to ﬁction than reality. In this regard, the assumptions most at odds with
current biological views include the notion of preferences that would be stable and impervious to the varied social factors
that seem to have a major bearing on all sorts of economic decisions. Social phenomena have had a large inﬂuence on the
evolution of the processes of affect, and the latter exert a huge inﬂuence on the matter of preferences and the calculation of
utility. Feelings, in all their variety, intensity, and valence, exert powerful inﬂuences on economic preferences (intriguingly,
the concepts behind terms such as “preferences” and “utility” in the vocabulary of economics, can be related to terms used
in the biology of homeostasis such as “need” and “reward”). Varied degrees of cooperation of kin and non-kin, regulation of
in-group and out-group behavior, social emotions, along with climate and geography, have generated varied historical paths
and thus varied cultures. Such cultures, as George Ackerlof has suggested, impose separate socio-cultural identities (Akerlof
and Kranton, 2010). Economic models which ignore the role of socio-cultural identities and their attendant affective proﬁles
are not likely to reﬂect reality.
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Because there is a dual nature to human homeostatic control, and because conscious deliberation is a patent human
eality, it is not likely that economic systems operating well only on the basis of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” (Smith,
776). The invisible hand idea ﬁts well the homeostatic world of bacterial cells, an un-minded world in which quorum
ensing accomplishes a lot of good governance and is indeed invisible. But the invisible hand does not capture fully to the
uman case. The wide variety of cultural instruments that human conscious feelingness and intellect have created, are subject
o their own cultural evolution. The responses they generate may  or may  not coincide with those that the evolutionarily
lder invisible hand devices would produce. It also appears to be the case that Adam Smith’s invisible hand idea has been
omewhat deformed in typical accounts of Homo economicus, as pointed out by Wilson (2015).
Another application of the perspective of homeostasis in economics pertains to the work of Soros (2013). Soros has
oted how the human factor in the operation of a decision system introduces an unpredicted effect of reﬂexivity which, in
urn, entails an increase in the fallibility of the system’s operation. Curiously, beginning at a far simpler biological level, the
rocesses of homeostasis engage a comparable phenomenon. Reﬂexivity promotes unstable, oscillatory behavior. Realistic
conomic conceptions should factor in such phenomena.
In practical terms, understanding the successes and problems of life regulation may  have something to contribute to
he optimization of economic regulatory systems. In general human terms, we believe that the scientiﬁc and philosophical
spects of these two sets of processes, natural life regulation and culturally invented economics, should be explored together.
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